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Payment system in the Indian context
The phenomenal of banking in the country in the post-nationalisation era has brought in the use of wide variety of media in settlement of financial transactions. Currency continues to be an important means of payment, although this has been supplemented in an increasing measure by cheques, drafts, payment orders etc. Considering that the dominant feature of Indian banking is branch-centered, the retail payment system has seen rapid growth. The total number of clearing houses are 860 of which 840 are managed by the State Bank of India and its associates, 14 by the Reserve Bank of India and the rest by nationalised bank. The cheque volumes cleared through these clearing houses has steadily increased and more particularly in the post liberalisation era. Keeping with this trend the payment process has also been upgraded by bringing in computerisation. The introduction of MICR cheques followed by the more recent establishment of Electronic Clearing Service (ECS) for high value transactions (limited to Rs 1 Lakh per instrument), Electronic Fund Transfers (EFT) at four metropolitan centres, the ATM facilities under the shared payment network system (SPNS) are cases in point.
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In respect of wholesale payment system, two paper based clearing settlements are undertaken. To cover the inter-bank transactions which are by nature large in value, inter-bank clearing has been introduced. This covers call money transactions, Rupee payment of foreign currency transactions , Bank to bank transfers for funding upcountry requirements and inward remittances. Secondly, high value clearing is organised where instruments with a face value of Rs. 1 lakh and above are cleared. At the end of 1997 the total value of instruments presented in this clearing was Rs 949,502 crore.
The Indian payment system in totality is net period settlement system. Considering that the cost involved are high and since risk factor in terms of principal risk/credit risk for the central bank is high, setting up of an RTGS system has been proposed. This is also expected to meet the requirements for an efficient and reliable payment system in the light of globalisation and the integration of Indian economy. Further, considering the diversified membership pattern of the payment system which includes urban co-operative banks, private banks etc. the chances of systemic risk can not be underestimated.
The proposed RTGS system in India (as shown in diagram) will consist of an apex level server having connectivity with servers of member banks. These bank level servers could be connected to their branches through VSAT network.
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Envisaged introduction of RTGS in India raises several issues concerning its smooth, stable and reliable working. These issues broadly relate to liquidity, queuing system and technology.
Under the RTGS management of intraday liquidity is critical. This in turn will depend upon extent of reserve requirements and the RBI current account structure and the linkages between these. For instance the question arises whether any shortfall in the RTGS account could be met out of the required reserves. In India level of required reserves is calculated as an average balance over a fortnight. If the RTGS account and the required reserve are unified, reserve requirements may not act as a binding constraint for intraday liquidity management. Banks can deviate temporarily from target reserve in order to make unexpected payments. However, as the end of the fortnight approaches (reporting Friday) reserve requirements are likely to have an impact because the scope to correct one day's shortfall by a subsequent day's surplus is correspondingly reduced.
Another way to provide covering funds for transfers is extension of RBI credit or overdrafts to Banks which may be against collateral securities. As in India, Statutory Liquidity Reserves are largely maintained in government of India securities or other approved securities, this would not pose any problem for individual banks.
A Second way to provide credit is through uncollateralised overdrafts, but imposing interest charges for the same. Under this system, RBI will have to bear the credit risk, but is partially compensated by levy on overdraft. In fact this levy is used to discourage availment of overdrafts. However, in case of banks in financial distress, or during a liquidity crisis, such levy may not act as disincentive.
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